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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE O·F UTAH
RELIABLE FURNITURE
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
AMERICAN HOME. ASSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation, WESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, a
corporation, GENERAL ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No.
10182

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDE.NTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant appeals from a summary judgment entered by the District Court of Salt Lake
County dismissing the appellant's suit against the
respondents based on a claim that the respondents
through economic duress compelled the appellant to
settle an insurance claim for less than the actual
loss.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The appellant submits the following statement
of facts as being the record properly before the
Court. The ·desposition of Samuel Herscovitz will
be cited (D), the hearings at pretrial as (P) and
the pleadings and other matters as (R):
1
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On M.arch 30, 1961, a fire occurred at the Reliable Furniture Company in Ogden, Utah (R-2,
D-3). The Company's operations were conducted
primarily by Mr. Samuel A. Herscovitz, the President and General Manager (R-2, D-3). At the time
of the fire, the appellant had two insurance policies
covering such a difficulty. The first was a standard
fire insurance policy covering the stock, inventory
and like losses. This policy was issued by Fidelity
and Guaranty Insurance Underwiters, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Fidelity, (R-7). Tl1e second policy was one covering business interruption losses and
was issued by the respondent American Home Assurance Company. The respondent General Adjustment Bureau, a corporation, was engaged to adjust
the stock loss for Fidelity (R-8), and also the business interruption loss for American ( R-6). The respondent Western General Agency, Inc. was the
general agent of both American .and Fidelity. Immediately following the fire, agents of General Adjustment met with Mr. Herscovitz in an effort to
determine the full extent of the loss (D-4. The salvage loss was determined (D-4), and the parties
negotiated with reference to the stock and inventory
claim. On May 3, 1961, Herscovitz executed .a proof
of loss in the amount of $84,923.39, and Fidelity
then had 60 days after receipt of the p~oof of loss to
investigate and determine whether payment should
be made in the amount den1anded (R-34~ 38). Subsequently, Herscovitz had several contacts with .ad2
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justers from General Adjustment, officers of
Fidelity and Mr. Jack Day, an officer of Western
General Agency, in an effort to settle the loss (D-10).
The furniture store was open for business in May,
but a "thrift center" (D-33), part of the retail operation, was closed until July 18th ( R-33, 44).
Herscovitz had a conversation with Mr. Ball,
an agent of General Adjustment, relative to settling
the business interruption loss (D-28) at which time
Herscovitz indicated that he was in no great hurry
to settle this claim. Ball indicated the loss would
be settled on the basis of the previous years' operations (D-28) for $48,000.00. Subsequently, a short
time later, Herscovitz filed his own proof of loss on
the business interruption claim in order to cause the
60 day pre-suit period to begin to run ( D-22, 29),
although he had shortly before said he was in no
hurry to settle (D-27).
On the 17th of June, 1961, Mr. Day said th.at
he thought he could get payment on the claim
against Fidelity (D-20, 21). On June 19, 1961, Mr.
Day, Mr. Ball, Mr. Herscovitz and Mr. Dykstra,
Reliable's bookkeeper, were present in Mr. Herscovitz' office in Ogden. The meeting lasted about four
hours in an effort to adjust the losses (D-35). Mr.
Ball spent the first two hours figuring .and working
out loss figures (D-35, 36). Mr. Ball then came to
Herscovitz and told him that the business interruption loss should be settled, and the Company would
go twelve thousand dollars (D-36). Mr. Herscovitz
3
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indicated that such a sum was not acceptable to hin1
(D-36). According to Mr. Herscovitz, both Mr. Ball
.and Mr. Day said the business interruption loss
would have to be settled along with the stock loss
and that payment of the $84,923.39 would not be
made unless the business loss was also settleld ( D36). Herscovitz allegedly objected but then accepted
a settlement in the sum of $12,609.39 which was
made out at that time along with .a proof of loss
release which Herscovitz executed. He also accepted
the $84,923.39 from Fidelity (D.-68). Subsequently,
Mr. Herscovitz consulted with counsel and presented
both drafts for payment and accepted the proceeds
(R-35).
Subsequently, the appellant filed a complaint
seeking to set aside the settlem·ent on the grounds
of economic duress and sued Fidelity, Western, General Adjustment and American for $303,698.46
claiming business loss and loss of profits by being
forced out of business. The appellant's accounting
records showed the Company had an operating loss
of $16,448.87 in 1959 and $98,078.-38 in 1960 (R-56,
65). An answer denying the allegation was filed.
Subsequently, an amended complaint setting forth
a similar cause of action in two separate counts was
served and answers filed. Appellant served a reply,
.although Rule 7A, U.R.C.P. did not call for such
action.
Subsequently, Fidelity, after discovery, n1oved
for summary judgment and it was granted. This
4
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Court affirmed, Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity
Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d
135 ( 1963) noting:
"We see nothing in the record justifying
such accusation [economic duress], or reflecting any incentive on the part of Fidelity so
to collude."
At the time of pretrial between appellant and
the remaining respondents, the appellant admitted
that $12,984.39 was paid by American to the .appellant, and that none of the money had been returned or a tender made (P-2). The execution by
Herscovitz of the proof of loss in the amount of
$12,603.39 was also admitted (P-2). The appellant
.also admitted that there was no evidence that Jack
Day had joint authority from the two Companies,
but only single authority from each (P-6). Further,
appellant admitted that it had no evidence that
Jack D.ay had joint authority from the two Companies, but only single authority from each (P-6).
Further, appellant admitted that it had no evidence
that American had told Day to withhold the $84,923.39 unless the $12,609.39 were paid and that
American h.ad no authority to do so (P-8). Mter
argument, the Honorable A. H. Elllett entered judgment for the respondents finding (R-59):
"From the foregoing and the pleadings it
appears conclusively and as a matter of law
that return or tender of the said sum of $12,609.39 was a condition precedent to rescission
df the settlement of plaintiff's unliquidated
5
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claim against defendant American Home Assurance Company; that plaintiff can produce
no evidence that the said Jack Day in allegedly withholding payment of said sum of
$84,000.00 check was acting as the agent of
defendants in concert or individually; that in
accepting said sum of $12,609.39 plaintiff was
not subject to duress which would justify legal
action against defendants.... "
The appellant has raised in its brief several
points upon which it claims a basis for reversal.
Many of these points do not appear to have .any
foundation in the record, and the solemn substance
of the appellant's brief can be answered in three
general points; consequently, the respondents' brief
will not attempt to answer the point-by-point allegations of the .appellant but will confine itself to the
material issue of fact and law raised by the appeal.
It is submitted that on the evidence and record,
this Court must affirm the judgment below.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED
THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT BASED ON THE TIMELY
FAILURE· OF APPELLANT TO TE.NDER RETURN OF THE MONIES PAID, AND THE
FAILURE TO RETURN THE MONIES PAID IS
A RATIFICATION OF THE SETTLEMENT.
A. The Necessity Of Tender.
The evidence in the instant case shows that the
appellant m.ade no tender of the money the respondents caused to be paid over for the business interrup·6
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tion loss. It further shows that the business interruption claim was a disputed and unliquidated
claim prior to the settlement reached by the parties.
Under these circumstances, it is clear the appellant
was required to tender return of the money paid
before it could prevail under any theory.
The relevant general principle of law is that
one who seeks to avoid the effect of a rele:a1se or
compromise must first tender return of the consideration paid in exch.ange for the release or compromise, 45 Am. J ur., RELEASE, Section 53 :
"The general principle [is] that one who seeks
to avoid the effect of a release must first return or tender the consideration paid him in
connection with his execution of· the release

. . ."

The rule is not limited to releases and applies
generally to an attempt to avoid compromises. It
is stated 134 A.L.R. 6, 8:
"The general principle that one who seeks
to avoid the effect of a release or compromise
of a claim, demand, or cause of action
(whether in an action or proceeding brought
solely to cancel or rescind the r,elease or instrument of settlement, or in an action or
proceeding brought primarily to enforce the
original demand or cause of action brought
for the dual purpose of setting aside the release or settlement and recovering on the original claim or demand) must first return or
tender the consideration, whether money or
property, paid him in connection with his
execution of the settlement or release, has
7
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found application or recognition in a large
number of cases involving the release or settlement of a wide variety of claims or demands."
Two major exceptions appear to be grafted on
to this general rule by the Courts ( 1) where the
release has been procured by fraud, primarily fraud
in the execution, 45 Am. Jur., RELEASE, Section
53; Indian, D.&W.R. Co. v. Fowler, 201 Ill. 152,
66 N.E 394, and (2) where the amount paid would
be due in any event. Tex.as Employers Insurance
Ass. v. Kenne,dy, 13'5 Tex. 486, 14'3 S.W. '2d 583
(1940).
There is no indication of any kind that any
amount was due the appellant, rather the sum
claimed and the subject of the instant contest is unliquidated and the subject of compromise.
With specific reference to insurance policies,
the rule is the same that tender is required-absent
the ab~ve or.· other non-applicable exceptions. 134
A.L.R~ 108 notes:
"The view has been taken in .a number of
cases. that where it ·is sought to avoid a settlement -or release of a claim under an insurance policy or fraternal benefit certificate a
return or tender of the consideration paid for
the release or settlement is a condition precedent to the granting of relief."
In Lyn v. Business Men's Assur. Co., 111 S.W.
2d 23'1 {K.'C. App. 1937), the. ~ansas Court had a
claim to set aside a release on the basis of fraud
and duress. The Court noted:
8
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"Plaintiff did not offer to return the
amount she received in the settlement and she
could not, under the facts of this case, recover
on the ground of fraud and duress."
Johnson v. Metropoli~an C~asrualty Insurance
Company, 258 App. Div. 775, 14 N.Y.S. 2d 895
(1939), involved an appeal·from a dismissal of a
complaint seeking to avoid an insurance settlement.
The complaint failed to allege the tender or restoration of the compromised amount. The basis of the
avoidance was duress. The Court stated:
"The plaintiff fails to allege that he either
restored or offered to restore the $600 received by him from the defendant under the
.alleged coercive settlement. Th absence of
such an allegation is fatal ... A settlement
induced by coercion is not necessarily void.
Such a settlement may be ratified by retaining benefits received thereunder."
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the general rule requiring tender or restoration in avoiding
a contract. In Morris v. Smith, 76 Utah 162, 288
Pac. 1068 (1930), the Court stated:
"It is an elementary rule, both of law and
equity, that one who is party to .a contract, or
in privity with such party, may not retain the
benefits of such contract and at the same time
repudiate is obligations."
In Eresman v. Overman, 11 Utah 2d 258, 358
P. 2d 85 (1961), the defendant sought by counterclaim to rescind a real property purchase contract.
In reversing a lower court decision in favor of rescission, the Utah Court stated:
9
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"At no time did the defendant offer to place
the parties in status quo, an essential to recission, by offering to be charged with and credit
plaintiff with a reasonable rental value for
the time during which she ocupied the pren1ises.''
There are apparently no Utah cases that have
concerned themselves with a requirement of tender
or restoration as it relates to economic duress, however substantial authority exists that a claim of
economic duress is no excuse for failure to restore.
In Meisel v. Mueller, 261 S.W. 2d 526 (Mo. App.
1953), a release had been executed based upon a
trademark abuse claim. The Court noted:
"Counsel for plaintiff in his brief complains that defendant Telephone Company
took .advantage of his clients' pressing need
for money when it concluded in the release the
name of defendant Mueller ... If economic
circumstances and pressing need for money
would obviate the necessity for returning the
consideration before setting aside a release or
any other contractual obligation, we would
have very few settlements of litigation. or disputes ... We hold it was necessary for plaintiff to offer to return the $600 before he can
escape the binding force of the _;releas~."
,

'

I

,.,.,

('

:•

.•

Dawson, ECONOMIC· DURESS~AN· ESSAY
IN PERSPECTIVE, 45 Mich. L. Rev. 253, 284
( 1947) notes:
"As a condition to recission the party
under. duress will be required to tender or
account for the value received by .him."
10
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The cases cited by the appellant relate to insurance contests over double indemnity, where the
principal sum is admittedly due. However, in this
case, there is no principal sum admittedly due. It
is incongruous to allow the appellant to claim duress,
and yet keep the benefits which he received where
there is no evidence that they were admittedly due.
In the absence of a tender, the trial court correctly ruled the suit could not be m.aintained.
B.

The Conduct Of Appellant. Ratified The Settlement.
A contract or release or compromise effected as
a result of duress renders the contract or release
only voidable not void. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Section 70. State v. Barlow, 107 Utah
292, 153 P. 2d 647 (1944). As a consequence, if a
person intentionally accepts benefits .arising from
such a contract or otherwise acts inconsistent with
the contention of duress, there may be a ratification
of the original release, contract or compromise, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Section 70a.
The rule is stated in 77 A.L.R. 2d 527, 528.:·
''A contract entered into under duress is
generally considered not void, but merely
voidable, and is capable of being ratified after
the duress is removed, such ratification resulting if the party entering into the contract
under duress intentionally accepts the benefits
growing out of it, remains silent, acquiesces
in it for any considerable length of time after
opportunity is afforded to .avoid it or have it
11
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annulled, or recognizes its validity by acting
upon it."
In determining ratification, the courts have
recognized that retaining the fruits of the campomise is inconsistent with an attempt to repudiate it,
and have found ratification. In the instant case,
Herscovitz sought the .advice of legal counsel and
then negotiated both settlement drafts of over
$92,000.00. He did not offer to return the monies
received. In this regard, the case of State v. Barlow,
107 Utah 292, 153 Pac. 2d 647 (1944), is pertinent
where the Court stated:
''As a rule, in a transaction requiring mutual consent, if consent is obtained by coercion, the victim may either affirm or avoid
the transaction, but he may not claim the
benefits and escape the obligations."
Implicit in the Court's language is the conclusion that accepting the benefits after the duress ends
constitutes ratification.
In Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 Pac.
826 (1924), the Utah Court stated:
" ... he had the benefit of able counsel who
had been his faithful legal counsel for 25
years . . . Moreover, he was a business man
of great .and varied experience and influence
. . . In addition to all that he was largely
benefited in being released from the terms
of the first contract, which was accomplished
by entering into the second one. Apart from
the fact, therefore, that the second contract
was. in essence and .effect a ratification and
· confirmation of the first one, under the undis1'2
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puted facts and circumstancess there was no
duress in the sense that the term is used and
understood."
Thus, the Utah Court noted that actions inconsistent with the agreement claimed to be obtained
by duress result in ratification. Additionally, the
Court recognized that legal advice may bear on ( 1)
the initial claim of duress and (2) subsequent ratification, if claimed.
In Farrington v. Granite Stake Fire Insurance
Comp.any, 120 Utah 109, 232 Pac. 2d 754 (1951),
the Supreme Court rejected the right of an insurance
company to rescind for misrepresentation where the
insurer knew of the facts a few days .after a fire
and accepted a premium payment knowing of the
fire, and did nothing 'till suit was brought. The
Court noted:
"One who claims a right of rescission must
act with reasonable promptness, and if after
such knowledge, he does .any substantial act
which recognizes the contract as in force, such
as the acceptance of the more than half of the
premium would be, such an act would usually
constitute a waiver of his right to rescind."
The old addage of "what is good sauce for the
goose, is also good sauce for the gander," is pertinent.
LeVine v. Whithouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2
(1910), was a case of fraud, but the Court stated
the rule:
"The rule is that, where a party h.as been
reduced to enter into a contract by false and
'13
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fraudulent representations, he may . . . rescind the contract, but the great weight of
authority holds that, if the party defrauded
continues to receive benefits under the contract after he has become aware of the fraud,
he will be deemed to have affirmed the contract and waived his right to rescind."
Of importance is the fact that the Court accepted the following quote from 9 Cyc. 436:
"The party defrauded will generally lose
his right to rescind if he takes any benefit
under the contract or does any act which implies an intention to abide by it or an affirmance of it after he has become aware of the
fraud."
The importance of the wording is the recognition of an intention or implication to affirm from
the act of .accepting the benefits.
In Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah 493, 51 Pac. 2d 222
(1935), another fraud case, ·the Court approved the
following quote from Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192
u.s. 232:
'' 'He cannot . . . treat the property as his
own and exercise acts of ownership ·over it
which shows an election to regard the same
as his, and .at the same time preserve his right
to rescission (sic.) '.'' .
In McKellar Real Estate & Insurance Co. v.
Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128 (1923),, the Court
speaking of rescission as to real estate. purchase
contract made it clear that a person seeking· to di$a:ffirm must do it in unequivocal terms ..and·_not exercise dominion over the property~·
14
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In 77 A.L.R. 426, 343, it is stated:
"While a contract voidable for duress may
be ratified, either by express consent, or by
conduct inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that of approval, still the intention
to ratify is an essential element and is at the
foundation of the doctrine of waiver or ratification."
Thus, intention being manifestly important in
determining ratification, the LeVine v. Whithouse
case dealing with fraud and rescission is important
in approving language that indicates a party will
lose his right of rescission by doing an act that "implies an intention" to be bound.
In the instant case, the facts before the trial
court clearly demonstrated ratification which when
coupled with the failure to make tender required
that judgment be given for the respondents, Gallon
v. Lloyd Thomas Co., 264 F. 2d 821; Restatement of
Contracts, Sections 499, 484. First, after Herscovitz
accepted both checks the claimed duress ended. Especially so when he cashed the $84,000.00 check,
since that eliminated the essence of any "wrongdoing" in the theory of economic duress. Thereafter,
instead of repudiating the $12,000.00 payment, he
retained it and sought to "keep his cake and eat it
too." He cashed the check, exercised sufficient dominion over the rest of the compromise so as to
indicate an .acceptance of the settlement. He could
not legally negotiate the check after the duress had
terminated. This is to be distinguished from the
15
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situation where the fraud or duress is not terminated prior to cashing the check or receiving money.
Further, full consultation with counsel was had
before any action was taken. Counsel must have advised of the danger of negotiating the check. As a
consequence, ratification or waiver exists, as a matter of law. Finally, it is inconsistent for appellant
to claim that the economic duress still continued,
since this would mean the alleged refusal of the
$84,000.00 payment, without the other, was not the
real source of his trouble, but it was actually his own
business .and financial problems not related to the
defendants' actions, and thus his claim of economic
duress, to the extent it involves a wrongful act of
the defendant, would not exist.
The trial court correctly ruled that the circumstances in failing to make a tender precluded appellant from maintaining its suit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT HAD NO CAUSE OF
ACTION BASED UPON A CLAIM OF ECONOMIC DURESS.
· In points 2 through 5, the appellant in effect
contends the trial court erred in granting judgment
for the respondent based upon the appellant's claim
of economic duress.
As to point 3 of appellant's brief, there is no
ev~dence that the Court relied upon statements of the
respondents' counsel to find appellant could not
16
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prove .a claim based on economic duress. The record
shows that the appellant's counsel admitted no "duress of goods" and that the Court based upon the best
evidence the appellant could offer, correctly ruled
that no claim of economic duress could be sustained.
The essence of the claim of appellant is one of
duress. At common law, duress of .an economic nature was usually associated with the detention of a
person's goods or chattel to extract an unnecessarily
rigorous payment. Astky v. Reynolds, 2 Strange
915, K.B. 1732 :·
'!'We think also, that this is a payment by
compulsion; the plaintiff might have such an
immediate want of his goods, that an action
in trover would not do his business where the
rule volenti nonfit injura is applied . . ."
The common law concept was therefore primarily limited to duress of goods. 13 C.J., CON:..
TRACTS, Section 316(3). However, the common
law theory of "economic duress" h.as been expanded.
17A Am. Jur., Duress and Undue lnflence, Section
7, notes:
"There is no doubt that the early common
law doctrine of duress h.as gradually expanded and broken through its original limi:..
tations, with the result that many states have
adopted the modern doctrine of 'business compulsion' or what is sometiPieS referred to as
'economic duress or compulsion'."
As to what specifically amounts to economic
duress, the texts and authorities have more often
spoken in terms of what it is not, 17A Am. Jur.,
1'7
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DURESS AND UNDUE INFLUENCE, Section 7,
notes:
" 'Business compulsion' is not established
merely by proof that consent was secured by
the pressure of financial circumstances. But
it is said that a threat of serious financial loss
is sufficient to constitute duress and ground
for relief where an ordinary suit at law or
equity might not be an .adequate remedy.
"To constitute duress or businesss compulsion there must be more than .a mere threat
which might result in injury at some future
time, such as a threat to injury to credit in
the indefinite future. It must be such a threat
that, in conjunction with other circumstances
and business necessity, the party so coerced
fears a loss of business unless he does so enter
into the contract demanded.''
In 17 C.J.S., CONTRACTS, Section 177, p. 536,
it is noted:
". . . the exercise of business pressure falling short of tortious conduct is ordin.arily not
regarded as duress, and business compulsion
exercised by an illegal combination of persons
has been held not to constitute duress."
Appelmlan, IN S'UR'AN CE LAW .A:ND PRACTIICE, Vol. ·s, Section 17'1'5, notes:
"Inducement of a settlement when a beneficiary was in financial difficulties does not
constitute duress. It has even been held that
threats of criminal prosecution do not fall in
this category."
In Kelley v. United Mutual Insurance Assn.,
112 S.W. 2d 929 (Mo. App. 1938), plaintiff filed suit
1

1
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to recover on several life insurance policies, which
she had compromised for $1,000.00. The plaintiff
contended, among other things, that she settled the
claim because of being pressed by severe economic
problems. The Court noted in holding that the claim
was without merit:
"Our examination of the evidence causes us
to conclude that there was no evidence to
justify the submission as to allege'd ·duress.
True it was shown that the beneficiary was
pressed with financial difficulties and such
m.ay have been an inducement to the signing
of the agreement. Such, however, does not
constitute duress."
In Manno v. Butual Beneficial Health & Accident Assoc., 187 N.Y.S. 2d 709 (1959, Sup. Ct.),
the plaintiff sued to received certain accident and
health insurance settlements. The essence of the
claim was that the plaintiff had sustained injuries
which prevented him from working, and that defendant refused to pay what was properly due and
was forced into a settlement. The complaint .alleged:
"That solely by reason of the economic duress practiced upon ·him and the coercion and
other acts of the defendant[s], including the
willful and deliberate breach of * * * [their]
· contract[s] with the plaintiff, and the physical condition and ill health of the plaintiff
at the time defendant[s'] representative imposed the defendant[s'] demands upon him,
plaintiff was unable to resist the defendant[s'] coercion and surrendered the aforesaid policies of insurance to the defendant[s']
19
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representative, receiving drafts totaling
$6, 700."
The defendant contended the complaint stated
no claim for relief. The Court granted the motion
to dismiss, and in doing so spoke of an awareness of
"modern doctrine of economic duress." The Court,
however, felt a claim was not stated. The Court
noted:
"The plaintiff has alleged, in substance, no
more than that he has suffered a total and
permanent disability, that defendants refused
to make payments under the policies and dr.liberately breached the contracts and that
whil~e he was alone and in bed due to his heart
condition 'he acceded to the defendants' demand to surrender the policies for a consideration of $'6, 770. This, the plaintiff has characterized as 'economic duress' and 'coercion'
practiced by the defendants. However, to allege that an agreement or setlement was made
under 'duress' or 'coercion' is to state no more
than a conclusion [citing .authorities]. Generally, it is not duress to do what one has the
legal right to do [cit. Ath.]. Similarly, a
threat to breach a contract does not, without
more constitute duress [ CA] ."
The decision is important because multiple defendants and policies were involved which is the
situation in the instant matter. Certainly, if American had taken advantage of Reliable's financial difficulties and forced a stringent bargain, no one could
conten·d economic duress existed. Thus, see 17A Am.
Jur., supra., Section 7, cited infra.
1

1
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In Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P. 2d 513
( 1939), the plaintiff contended he was compelled
to sign collateral crop financing agreements because
of economic duress. In rejecting the argument, the
Washington Courte stated:
"Contracts, sales, or compromises made under stress of pecuniary necessity are of daily
occurrence, and if such urgency is to affect
their validity, no one could safely negotiate
with a party who findss himself in difficulty
by virtue of financial adversities."
The Manno case, supra, is additionally important since it seems to recognize that the presence of
mulitiple policies and an effort to fully compromise
between rn:any defendants offers no greater basis
for a claim of duress than otherwise.
In Steward v. World-Wide A~utomobiles Corporation, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 540 (1959, Sup. Ct.), the
Court followed the Mann.o case .and held "no cause of
action" where defendants threatened to dissolve
plaintiff's franchise, which would have been a breach
of contract, unless the plaintiff sold her stock. The
Court determined a mere threat to breach a contract
cannot amount to duress.
In Doernbecher v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 16 Wash. ,2d 64, 13·2 P. 2d 7'51 (1943), the
Washington Court was faced with another insurance
compromise case. The insurance company obtained
a release of insurance policies for a premium payment from the beneficiary with a threat of civil
action, where the beneficiary due to her husband's
21
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illness could not undertake court action. The Washington Court found no cause of action.
In Hackley v. Headly, 47 Mich. 489, 8 N.W.
511, a dispute over scaling logs. arose between the
p.arties. One party was in severe financial straits
and the other refused to make payment forcing a
settlement for an amount less than claimed. In refusing to find duress, the Michigan Supreme Court
ruled:
"In what did the alleged duresss consist in
the present case? Merely in this : th.at the
debtors refused to pay on demand a debt already due, though the plaintiff was in great
need of the money and might be financially
ruined in case he failed to obtain it. It is not
pretended that H.ackley & McGordon had done
anything to bring Headley to the condition
which made the money so important to him
at this very time, or that they were in any
manner responsible for his pecuniary embarrassment except as they failed to pay this
demand. The duress, then, is to be found
exclusively in their failure to meet promptly
their pecuniary obligation. But this, according to the plaintiff's claim, would have consttiuted no duress whatever if he had not
happened to be in pecuniary straits; and the
validity of negotiations, .accordi:qg to this
claim, must be determined, not by the defendants' conduct, but by the plaintiff's necessities.
The same contract which would be valid if
made with a m.an easy in his circumstances,
becomes invalid when the contracting party
is pressed with the necessity of immediately
meeting his bank paper. But this would be a
most dangerous, as well · as a most unequal
22
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doctrine ; and if accepted, no one could well
know when he would be safe in dealing on
the ordinary terms of negotiation with a
party who professed to be in great need."
It would be concluded- that in insurance settlement and other like cases, mere economic pressure
usually will not constitute duress.
Other cases, not directly relating to the insur~
ance situation, are relevant in weighing whether
economic duress exists in the instant situation.
In Hartsville Oil & Mill v. United States, 271
U.S. 43 (1926), plaintiff sued for additional compensation under a war contract, which petitioner
claimed was still in effect and not superseded by
another contract, which it contended was procured
by duress. Mter the end of the war (W.W. 1), the
gov~rnment threatened to terminate plaintiff's contract with the government providing for the purchase of certain items. The government contract contained a clause so allowing but the government also
would refuse .accrued obligations. The government
told plaintiff if he would execute a new cpntract it
would continue to purchase at· a reduced rate, otherwise not; The plaintiff contended he would have been
economically ruined if the government had cancelled
outright and therefore signeld the reduced contract.
The Supreme Court denied recovery feeling that this
was merely a threat to breach a contract (so also is
the wrongful refussal to settle an insuran.ce claim) .
The Court said:
23
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"But a threat to break a contract does not
in itself constitute duress. Before the coercive
effect of the threatened action can be inferred,
there must be evidence of some probable consequences of it to person or property for which
the remedy afforded by the courts is inadequate.''
Certainly, if Reliable would only suffer a loss
of money or economic injury, which would be compensable by the courts, it cannot complain. Indeed,
Herscovitz stated he was aware of his court remedies
(D-38, 47).
Other cases have reached similar conclusions.
French v. Shoemaker, 14 Wall. 314 (U.S.); Gill v.
S.H.B. Corporation, 322 Mich. 700, 34 N.W. 2d 526.
French v. Shoemaker, supra, is of relevance in
this area and is a landmark case There four parties,
owners of interests in a railroad company, had a
dispute as to their relative ownership. They negotiated a settlement contract dividing the ownership
proportionately among themselves. One of the parties thereafter contended that because of the dangerous nature of his pecuniary situation and threats of
further damage from the other parties, he was
·forced to compromise. The Supreme Court rejected
a contention of economic duress noting:
"Enough appears in the record to convince
the Court that the respondent was in straitened circumstances, that his business affairs
had become complicated, that he was greatly
embarrassed with litigations, and that he was
in pressing want of pecuniary means, but the
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Court is wholly unable to see that the complainant is responsible for these circumstances or that he did any u·nlawful act to
deprive the respondent of his property, or to
create those necessities or embarrassements

. . ."

This case states the general rule th.at before
breach of contract or pressure on a person in financial difficulties will be deemed duress, the party so
taking advantage must have in part -been responsible for the plight.
In the Government Contractor, BRIEFING
PAPERS, ECONOMIC DURESS\ page 3, (April
1964), it is noted:
''When, however, financial difficulties prevent
you from taking an alternative course, it has
been held that the Govt must in some way be
- responsible for your financial plight (e.g., by
its withholding 'payments lawfully due you).
The mere stress of business conditions is not
necessarily sufficient to spell out the 'no alternative' element of duress (or, for that
matter, the 'forced consent' (element)." -

*

*

*

"If it is financial difficulties which leave
you with no alternative course other than to
consent to the Govt's demands, be prep.ared
to prove that the Govt is in some way responsible for (or has materially contributed to)
your financial plight."
._
1

The Government is often pressed with clainis of economic duress, in contract termination settlements. Consequently, many of the landmark cases are decisions from
the Supreme Court or lower federal courts.
25
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In Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United
States, 126 Ct. Cis. 51, (1953), the plaintiff alleged
that he accepted a price revision because the government had used economic duress. In denying the
claim, the Court stated:
" ... In order to substantiate the allegation
of economic duress or business compulsion the
plantiff must go beyond the mere showing of
a reluctance to accept .and of financial embarrassment. There must be a showing of acts
on the part of the defendant which produced
these two factors. The assertion of duress
must be proven to have been the result of the
defendant's conduct and not by the plaintiff's
necessities. In DuPuy v. United States, 68
C.Cls. 348, 381, this court stated:
'* * * In order to successfully defend
on the ground of force or duress, it must
be shown th.at the party benefited thereby contrained or forced the action of the
injured party, and even threatened financial disaster is not sufficient. * * *'
"It has become settled law that the mere
stress of business conditions will not constitute duress where the defendant was not responsible for those circumstances. Lawrence
v. Muter Co., 171 F. 2d 380, 382, cert. den.,
337 U.S. 907; Silliman v. United States, 101
u.s. 465, 471."
See also Silliman v. United States, 101 U.S. 465.
The appellant's financial plight was in no sense
the fault of the respondents. Indeed, appellant had
been operating at a loss for sometime, and w.as pri·marily in economic difficulty due to the fire and
26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

business circumstances wholly without the fault of
respondents. Clearly, this alone justifies the trial
court's result.
Where an adequate remedy at law exists, there
can be no claim of economic duress. Board of
1'rustees v. Wilson Company, 133 F. 2d 399 (app.
D.C. 1943), where the Court said:
"Its denial of the right to rescind did not
conclude the question. Appellee could litigate
it. Appellant was equally entitled to litigate
it or, as it did in effect, threaten to litigate it.
It follows there was no duress."
Also, Hale, BARGAINING, DURESS AND
ECONOMIC LIBERTY, 43 Col. L. Rev. 603.
The Utah cases are not particularly helpful
since in Buford v. Lonegran, 6 Utah 301, 22 Pac.
164 (1889), the Territorial Supreme Court was involved only with a duress of goods problem, not
a true situation of economic bargaining.
In Flack v. National Bank, 8 Utah 19'3, 30 Pac.
746 (1892), the Territorial Court again had a claim
of duress. This case is more directly applicable to
the instant case than the Buford case. There, the
bank induced the plaintiff by threat of .attachement
to transfer funds to satissfy payment of a note. The
bank was aware of the serious economic straits of
plaintiff and possibility of creditor attachment .and
used this to induce transfer. The :Court did not
speak of the economi~ asp~ects except to note they
were real, but the Court found nothing wrong with
27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pressing for early payment when plaintiff was bad
off, noting :
"Under all the evidence of the case, we
think the defendant had good reason to feel
uneasy about the ultimate payment of the
note, and it is not strange that security should
have been demanded."
This is a recognition of the previously stated
principle that pressing for .a legally proper settlement is not improper merely because the circumstances of the party pressed are economically difficult.
Ellison v. Pingree, 64 Utah 468, 231 Pac. 826
f1'9 24), is the only Utah Suprem~e 'Court case dealing
with economic duress and strongly supports a conclusion that something more than financial embarrassment is necessary. Pingree was a wealthy corporate officer and financier who made personal loans
to the company to secure creditors. The corporation
was in some difficulty and might otherwise have
been pressed into receivership. Certain creditors of
the company had threatened Pingree also with criminal prosecution if he had not loaned the money to
the company. Pingree sought to void the loan. In
effect, Pingree claimed he had been coerced into accepting the business settlements.
On appeal, Pingree's counsel in their brief contended as to Pingree th.at :·
" ... at the time he signed these contracts
he was so environed, so circumstanced in fin.ancial. matters that· he was. compelled on
1
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account of the threats that were made !against
him, to sign the contracts in controversy, and
that if it had not been for this environment
and these threats he never would have signed
them."
The Court held there was no sufficient duress
shown to make out a prima facie case, although the
threats were receivership and financial injury to the
corporation and financial injury and criminal prosecution for Pingree. The Court stated:
"This statement is made so often and in so
m.any ways, that there is no room for doubt
that it was not fear of imprisonment or loss
of liberty, or of any personal injury, violence,
or harm that induced Mr. Pingree to sign the
contracts. He, however, said that what he was
afraid of was that complaints against him
might affect his credit and might hurt the
credit of the institutions with which he was
connected, namely, the various banks."
The Court concluded:
"In our judgment the district court was
clearly right in holding that under Mr. Pingree's own statements he utterly failed to establish duress as that term is understood and
applied by the courts."
Thus, Utah follows the rule that mere threat
of business injury, even when coupled with a threat
of criminal prosecution will not give rise to a cause
of action. This is the general rule. Restatement,
CONTRACTS, Section 49~3 Il1us. 1'5: Williston,
OONTRA'CT·s, Rev. Ed. Section 1608.
The .appellant cannot, by calling money "Prop29
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erty", prevail in any sense. First, because the historical setting of th·e law of duress amply sustains
the contention that duress of property, meant chattels owned by the person claiming duress. 1 Blackstone, ~coMMEN'TARTE'S '181; Berger v. Bonnell
Motor Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 589, 133 Atl. 778; Cobb v.
Charter, 32 Conn. 350 (1865); Cowley v. Fabien,
204 N.Y. 566, 97 N.E. 458 (1912); Woodward,
QUASI CONTRACTS, Section 216; D.awson, supra,
45 Mich. L. Rev~ 253, 254 (1947). Second, the appellant did not own anything; it may or may not
have been entitled to money, but if so, it arose by
contract and appellant only had right to recover if
·he could show a right under the contract. Under
each insurance contract, appellant bore the burden
·of proof, and no set sum was payable. Clearly therefore, appellant's attempt to bring itself within the
"duress of property" rule is erroneous. Finally, the
Courts have consistently ruled a threat not to pay a
contractual demand is not economic duress. This is
hornbook law. Patterson, RESTITUTION, page 9
(1950):
"By the weight of authority, threatened
breach of contract is held not to be duress, the
remedy for breach of contract being deemed
adequate to relieve the promisee of coercion."
See Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284; Cable
v. Foley, 4:5 Minn. 421, 47 N.W. 11'35 ·(refusal to
pay ·plaintiff money which he needed to pay employees).
As to. point 4 of appellant's brief, relating to
1
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borrowing money, it has no basis in the record, but
only goes to show that the economic difficulties of
appellant were its own and not attributable to respondents.
As to point 5, the appellant indicates that a fact
situlrution .exists. This misapp'lies the question of
whether the conduct was economic duress, which is a
question of law. As noted in The Government Contractor, supra, page 6:
" ... whether the events and circumstances
you allege as constituting duress really occurred-these are questions of fact.
"Finding th.at such events did occur-do
they spell 'economic duress'? This is a question of law."
See Meyer v. Gu.ardian Trust Co., 296 Fed. 789
(1924):
"What constitutes duress is a matter of law."
The summary judgment admits the evidence
that is now before the Cou-rt. The question, therefore, is does this amount to ·duress? T'his is a question
of law which from the cases and authorities it clearly
appears the trial court correctly ruled against the
appellant.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The evidence was before the trial court, and it
was a proper forum to rule on whether duress was
present, or whether a tender should have been made.
This being so, all other questions are irrelevant if
31
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tender should have been m.ade or if actionable duress
was not present. Both of these questions, from what
has been set out before, must be answered against
the appellant. Indeed, the case of Reliable Furniture
Co. v. Fidelity Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 14
Utah 2d 169,380 P. 2d 135 (1963), where this Court
sustained a motion for summary judgment, removing Fidelity from the case, would compel as much
in this case.
The question of the agency of the alleged acting
persons is rendered immaterial; however, it is
enough to note that a pretrial, the appellant admitted that there was no evidence that Day had
joint authority to serve both companies or joint
duties. The only evidence is that a general .agency
agreement with Day's company had been entered
into some years before. But, this is not enough to
show agency to act in this case, but is merely the
right to sell or issue policies and otherwise act as a
general insurance agent.
The posture of the case was properly one for
summary ju·dgment; Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d
251, 351 P. 2d 624 (1960), and this Court should
affirm.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has raised several points, but few
issues, on appeal. Most of the appellant's contentions
are unsupported by the record, and therefore afford
no means by which this Court could review the
3'2
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claimed error. What is before this Court is the failure of the appellant to tender return of the money
which was the subject of the alleged duress compromise. In the .absence of a return or proper tender,
the instant action was properly dismissed. Additionally, the trial court correctly ruled that the fact
situation before it did not constitute economic duress.
This being the legal basis of the appellant's claim 'for
relief, the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment. This Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
REX J. HANSON
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendants-Respondents
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